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1 
One of the most fascinating topics in contemporary economics concerns the role of 
history. Is history important for the economic performance of countries and regions? Will the 
effects of history ultimately fade out or will they constrain economies in the long run?   
The new institutionalism view suggests that history is important because it shapes 
institutions and institutions shape the economy. For instance, La Porta et al. (1999) argue 
that being colonized by the British Empire rather than by other countries had a profound 
effect on the legal system and through that on the economies concerned. Acemoglu et al. 
(2001 and 2002) show that mortality rates among early European colonialists explain the 
types of institutions adopted, which have persisted to the present. Thus, current differences 
in development can be traced back to the colonial origins of the institutions. Banerjee and 
Iyer (2005) show that differences in the institutions set up by the British to collect land 
revenue in India lead to sustained differences in economic performance. 
Although the economists’ emphasis has been so far on formal rules, the concept of 
institutions is wider. Institutions include both formal rules, such as constitutions, laws, and 
property rights, and informal constraints, such as sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct. For instance, North (1991: 97) defines institutions  as “the humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” and argues that 
informal constraints matter: “We need to know much more about culturally derived norms of 
behavior and how they interact with formal rules to get better answers (...). We are just 
beginning the serious study of institutions” (North, 1990: 140). Similarly, Glaeser et al. 
                                                            
1  We are grateful to Luigi Cannari, Salvatore Chiri, Michela Dini, Gilles Duranton, Stefano Iezzi, Marco 
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their data. A previous version of this paper circulated with the title “Putnam’s Social Capital and the Italian 
Regions: An Empirical Investigation”. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily 
those of the Bank of Italy. Correspondence to: guido.deblasio@bancaditalia.it; giorgio.nuzzo@bancaditalia.it. 
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(2004) underscore that countries differ in their stocks of human and social capital and 
institutional outcomes depend to a large extent on these endowments.  
In this paper, we attempt to investigate the importance of history for economic 
performance by studying the role of informal constraints. We focus on one of the most 
widely quoted instances of informal rules, namely the concept of social capital proposed by 
Putnam (1993). This concept refers to trust, reciprocity, and habits of co-operation that are 
shared among members of a local community.
2 Putnam’s theory can be summarized by two 
propositions. First, central and northern Italy has developed faster than southern Italy 
because it was better endowed with social capital. Second, the endowments of social capital 
across Italian regions have been highly persistent over the centuries. In particular, it was the 
local political regimes in place in the middle ages that shaped the degree of local civic 
commitment that persisted through the centuries. By studying the importance of social 
capital for economic performance in the context of the Italian regions, our study thus 
provides an empirical investigation of Putnam’s theory.
3  
Besides its historical importance, focusing on the case of Italy also has additional 
advantages. First, studying the variation of informal institutions within the same country, 
under the same set of formal institutions, it enables us to assess the relative importance of 
informal constraints versus formal rules (Diankov et al., 2003). Moreover, focusing on 
within-country variations helps to avoid some of the omitted variable problems associated 
with cross-countries studies (see, for instance, Temple, 2002). Finally, since we estimate the 
effect of social capital by using a microeconomic unit of observation as the dependent 
variable, the potential problem of reverse causality, which is prevalent in the empirical 
literature on institutions and development, is minimized (see: Isham and Kaufman, 1999).  
                                                            
2   In this paper the term “social capital” is used in the meaning indicated by Putnam (1993). Clearly, this is 
not the only possible meaning of the word, as the literature on the definitions of social capital is voluminous. 
See, for a survey,  Durlauf and Fafchamps (2006). 
 
3   The importance of informal constraints for the development of Italy was also underlined by Banfield 
(1958) in The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Supported by the results of in-the-field research on the 
residents of a small village near Potenza (fictionally called Montegrano), Banfield concludes that “extreme 
poverty and backwardness is to be explained largely … by the inability of the villagers to act together for their 
common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate material interest of the nuclear family” 
(Banfield, 1958: 38).  
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To evaluate the relevance of social capital, we start by regressing current economic 
performance on current social capital. The latter is proxied by Putnam’s (1993) measure of 
political participation, which refers to voter turnout in referenda. Our test is based on three 
individual outcomes that are key for the underdevelopment of the south of Italy: labour 
productivity, entrepreneurship, and female labour market participation. These activities 
represent aspects of economic performance for which there are clear-cut theoretical 
predictions as to the positive impact of social capital. For instance, low levels of labour 
productivity in the south could depend on social norms that encourage shirking (Ichino and 
Maggi, 2000). They could also reflect the impact of low social capital on the credit market  
(Guiso et al., 2004), local government performance (Putnam, 1993), and the functioning of 
the judiciary (World Bank, 2005). Similarly, low rates of entrepreneurship could be the 
result of a culture that discourages risk-taking (Alesina et al., 2001). Linear regressions show 
that there is a positive correlation between the endowments of social capital at the local level 
and the three outcomes after controlling for individual characteristics. However, there are a 
number of reasons for not interpreting linear regression results as causal. There could be a 
substantial measurement error since the social capital measure could correspond poorly with 
the social capital that matters in practice. This would create attenuation bias. Moreover, there 
could be omitted geographical characteristics along with endogeneity problems.  
To solve these problems, we exploit Putnam’s conjecture on the origins of social 
capital to derive a possible source of exogenous variation for current social capital.  
We start by using the regional data on social capital collected by Putnam (1993) for the 
period following the unification of Italy in 1870. These indicators refer to two aspects of 
civic traditions, namely the turnout in the few relatively open elections before Fascism 
brought authoritarian rule to Italy and the density of local associations. There is a strong 
(first-stage) relationship between nineteenth-century variables and current social capital. Our 
two-stage least square estimates show that the component of social capital explained by 
history is positively correlated with the three individual outcomes. This is true even after 
controlling for nineteenth-century population density and contemporaneous education, which 
according to Tabellini (2005) helps to disentangle the effect of the historical variables from 
that of unobserved determinants of current performance. The exclusion restriction implied by 
our approach is that, conditional on the controls included in the regression, the measures of    10 
social capital a hundred years ago have no effect on individual economic outcomes today, 
other than through the persistence of social capital. We use over-identification tests to detect 
whether this exclusion restriction is reasonable and find no evidence for a direct effect of 
nineteenth-century social capital endowments on the three individual outcomes. As to the 
economic magnitude, the role of social capital is large but not implausible. Our estimates 
imply that moving from the average southern province to the average province in the centre 
and north would increase labour productivity by 12 per cent, the likelihood of becoming an 
entrepreneur by 4 per cent, and the probability of a woman of participating in the labour 
market by 13 per cent. We also find that two-stage least square estimates are larger than 
those from linear regression. By using an alternative contemporary measure of social capital 
as instrument we check whether the measurement error in social capital is of the right order 
of magnitude to explain the difference between linear and two-stage least square results. We 
find that this is indeed the case. 
Next, we use data on the local systems of government in early medieval Italy.  This 
amounts to pushing  Putnam’s conjecture as far as it can go. Putnam (1993) argues that the 
differences in social capital endowments today are plainly traceable from the systems of 
government prevailing at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Local communities that 
featured a higher degree of republicanism in middle ages turn out, at the end of the twentieth  
century, to be those most endowed with social capital. We rely on historical sources to 
classify today’s Italian provinces according to the political regimes prevailing at the 
beginning of the fourteenth century. We identify four regimes, corresponding to differing 
degrees of republicanism and autocracy: the communes, the heartland of republicanism; the 
signorie, former communal republics fallen prey to signorial rule by the beginning of the 
fourteenth century; the Papal State, characterized by a mixture of feudalism, tyranny, and 
republicanism; and the Kingdom of Sicily, marked by the highest degree of autocracy. In this 
case, the exclusion restriction implied by our approach is that, conditional on the controls 
included in the regression, the measures of local political regimes seven hundred years (!) 
ago have no effect on individual economic outcomes today, other than through social capital 
persistence. While the results of this experiment should be viewed with caution because the 
mapping of contemporary Italian provinces into mediaeval areas can only be imperfect, the 
results are encouraging. We find a strong (first-stage) relationship between fourteenth-   11 
century political variables and current endowments of social capital. Our two-stage least 
square estimates show that the component of social capital explained by mediaeval local 
political systems is positively correlated with entrepreneurship and female labour market 
participation. However, as to the effect on worker productivity, the over-identification test 
does not allow us to reach a conclusion. 
Empirically, our work is linked to a number of other attempts to uncover the  economic 
relevance of Putnam’s theory. Putnam himself, jointly with Helliwell, provided a first 
empirical investigation in 1995. Using cross-region growth regressions, they show that 
income convergence is faster for regions with relatively high levels of social capital. 
However, aggregate data might suffer from substantial shortcomings: the extent of trust may 
be correlated with other aspects of the regions that are omitted from the growth regressions 
(see also Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2006). In an attempt to provide more informative 
empirical work, recent papers have shifted to micro data. Ichino and Maggi (2000) use 
individual data on absenteeism and misconduct episodes for a single Italian bank and 
conclude that workers born in the south are more likely to behave dishonestly. Even though 
they do not use any measure of social capital, they explicitly refer to Putnam’s thesis to 
justify their results. Guiso et al. (2004) use household micro data to show that measures of 
civic engagement help explain the variation in financial practices across Italian regions. 
Similarly to Ichino and Maggi (2000) and Guiso et al. (2004), this paper studies the impact 
of social capital by using micro data. However, in contrast with Ichino and Maggi (2000), we 
use data that are representative of the Italian population at large; and unlike Guiso et al. 
(2004) we look at the real and not the financial effects of social capital. Crucially, in contrast 
with all previous studies we refer to Putnam’s theory on the origins of social capital to 
identify a source of exogenous variation in social capital. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates the use of our dependent 
variable, describes the data, and presents linear regression estimates of individual economic 
outcomes on social capital. Section 3 explains the two-stage least square results. Section 4 
concludes.    12 
2. The Effect of Social Capital: OLS and LPM Estimates 
2.1 Dependent Variables 
Our aim is to understand whether social capital makes a difference in explaining the 
varying prosperity of areas of Italy. At the same time, we hope to shed some light on the 
mechanisms through which social capital affects economic performance. We focus on three 
main aspects (the dependent variables in our investigation): worker productivity, 
entrepreneurship, and female participation in the labour market. These aspects provide a 
natural and attractive territory to analyze the effects of social capital on economic activity. 
First, for each of them there are clear-cut theoretical predictions as to the positive impact of 
social capital.
4 Second, they represent some of the key features of Italy’s dual development 
process. 
In Italy, geographical divergences in workers’ productivity are pronounced. While 
nation-wide labour productivity is not far from the OECD average (see, for example, IMF, 
2002), the gap in the south is about 20 per cent (see: Mauro et al., 1999).
5 We estimate the 
effect of social capital on individual productivity by exploiting a Mincerian wage-equation 
augmented with a local social capital term. In Appendix 1 we present a simple model that 
provides a theoretical justification of the approach followed here. The model shows that in 
equilibrium competitive firms will be happy to pay higher wages in areas with higher social 
capital endowments. As to the channels through which social capital impacts on firms’ TFP, 
our approach provides reduced-form estimates. Therefore, it accommodates a number of 
potential explanations. In this vein, a reduced labour productivity could be due to social 
norms that encourage shirking (Ichino and Maggi, 2000). Moreover, it could reflect the 
impact of low social capital on the credit market  (Guiso et al., 2004), the performance of 
local government (Putnam, 1993), and the functioning of the judiciary (World Bank, 2005). 
Additionally, the higher reliance on personal networking in job search in low-trust areas may 
help to damp down wages (see: Pistaferri, 1999). 
                                                            
4    As recognized by Arrow (1972: 357): “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an 
element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much 
of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence”.  
5   See also Castronuovo (1992). According to Chiades et al. (2000) and Aiello and Scoppa (2001) this 
figure could well be on the conservative side.    13 
The Italian economy relies more than those of other OECD countries on small business 
activity.
6 The distribution of firms across regions is far from uniform: Italian firms are 
concentrated in the centre and north of Italy. Again, a lack of trust can adversely affect 
entrepreneurship through a number of channels. While it is not easy to overstate the role of 
the credit market, local government and the judiciary, there may be also additional channels.  
To the extent that social capital promotes a better protection of property rights and deters 
crime, it stimulates business initiatives (Mauro, 1995 and Hall and Jones, 1999). According 
to Alesina et al. (2001), the south of Italy is an area where the prevailing “culture” 
discourages private activity and entrepreneurship. 
Female non-participation is essentially a southern issue: the participation rate for 
southern women is 35 per cent, more than 15 percentage points below the average for the 
north and less than half that for men in the south. Low-trust communities have social norms 
against working women. According to Putnam (1993: 175), in the south of Italy the 
pervasiveness of strong family ties comes at the expense of the networks of civic 
engagement that feature in the northern regions. In these traditional families, the concept of a 
male breadwinner prevails. This echoes Banfield’s amoral familism archetype: in daily life 
in Montegrano there was little room for women to entertain professional aspirations beyond 
housekeeping, child-care, and, if necessary, making a heavy contribution to the family farm. 
The importance of cultural factors in explaining the gender gap in labour force participation 
has recently been highlighted by Antecol (2000); while Algan and Cahuc (2003) study the 
impact of religion, perhaps a peculiar type of informal norm, on female participation.  
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our main data source is the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). This 
survey is conducted every two years by the Bank of Italy on a representative sample of about 
8,000 households (see Brandolini and Cannari, 1994, for details). The SHIW collects 
individual data on demographics and economic behaviour, such as age, sex, marital status, 
number of children, wages, work status, schooling, work experience, branch of activity, 
                                                            
6   According to Eurostat, in 2000 the average firm size in Italy was equal to 3.6 employees, representing 
the smallest size among European countries. 
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household net wealth. The confidential version of the SHIW we use makes available data on 
the province of residence. This information allows us to augment our individual-data 
regressions with the variables defined at local level, such as social capital. Since 1993 the 
survey has maintained the same structure and therefore we pool data from the last four 
waves (1993, 1995, 1998, 2000). 
Table 1a reports summary statistics for the variables used throughout the paper. Panel 
A in Table 1a describes the three individual economic outcomes that are the dependent 
variables in our regressions. Worker productivity is measured by the log of hourly wages for 
a sample of 23,097 employees. Entrepreneurship is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
individual is the sole proprietor of a business, member of a family business, or active 
shareholder/partner, for a sample of 14,694 household heads. Female participation is an 
indicator variable for working-age women employed or actively looking for work (the 
female sample includes 14,070 observations). Appendix 3 provides a detailed description of 
each variable. Panel B in Table 1a provides descriptive statistics for the main SHIW 
variables used in the paper. 
Panel C and Panel D in Table 1a describe the variables defined at the local level. Table 
1b presents the correlation matrix. Our (main) measure of social capital is the average 
provincial electoral referenda turnout for the six referenda held before the 1990s. Each 
referendum invited citizens to express their views on a controversial issue: the choice 
between republic and monarchy (1946); the legalization of divorce (1974) and abortion 
(1981), hunting (1987); the use of nuclear power (1987); the scope of public security 
regulations (1978, 1981). As explained by Putnam (1993: 93-94), referendum turnout 
captures well civic engagement: “the primary motivation of the referendum voter is concern 
for public issues” (Putnam, 1993: 93). In particular, there are two reasons to prefer 
referendum turnout to general election turnout. First, in Italy until recent years it was a legal 
duty to participate in general elections but not in referenda. Thus, very likely many Italians 
went to the polls irrespective of their sense of civic duty. Second, voting in general elections 
can lead to personal patronage benefits. It might be an opportunity  to obtain immediate 
personal benefits; that is, an “exchange” and not a measure of civic involvement. In this 
paper, we use the measure of referenda turnout calculated at the provincial level by Guiso et 
al. (2004). Referendum turnout captures well north-south differences: the average    15 
referendum turnout amounts to 85.5 per cent in the 59 central and northern provinces and 
72.7 per cent in the 40 southern provinces.
7  
2.3 Ordinary Least Squares and Linear Probability Model Regressions 
Table 2 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) and linear probability model (LPM) 
regressions for the three individual economic activities. We will investigate the role of social 
capital by running regressions of the form: 
(1)  yipt = constant + αt + β SCp + Xit γ + Zp δ + εipt  
where yipt is our outcome of interest for individual i in province p and year t, αt is a year 
fixed effect, SCp is the measure of social capital in province p, Xit are control variables 
defined at the individual level, and  Zp are control variables defined at the geographical 
level. The coefficient of interest throughout the paper is β, the effect of social capital on 
economic outcomes. Note that we do not include province fixed effects, since SCp is fixed 
for province p over time. However, we do adjust our standard errors for within-province 
correlation (see: Moulton, 1990). 
For each dependent variable, the first column shows the results obtained by regressing it 
on social capital, a minimal set of individual controls (age or experience, years of schooling, 
sex, marital status, number of children), and the year fixed effects. Social capital enters 
significantly and with the expected  positive sign for all the three economic activities.
8 
Clearly, these results are hardly convincing. While high-trust areas are almost 
exclusively located in the centre and north of the country, this area differs from the south in 
many respects, such as geography, infrastructure, access to markets, etc. Thus, social capital 
can pick up differences between the centre and north and the south that just happen to be 
                                                            
7   Because of data availability (see Appendix 3), our sample includes 99 of the 103 provinces that span the 
national territory. 
 
8   As for the individual controls, they enter with a similar sign and statistical significance to that found in 
the previous literature. See, for instance, Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2006a) and Colussi (1997) on worker 
productivity; Barca and Cannari (1997) and Alesina et al. (2001) on entrepreneurship; del Boca et al. (2000) on 
female participation.    16 
correlated with it. To correct for this, we introduce in the second column for each dependent 
variable a dummy for individuals residing in the south.
9 The consequences of this inclusion 
are noticeable. The role of social capital is now not statistically different from zero for 
worker productivity, while the effect on female participation is reduced by a third. 
Entrepreneurship represents an exception, as the magnitude of the effect of social capital 
remains constant.  
Next, we control our results with respect to the inclusion of additional variables at the 
individual level. These variables are also from the SHIW dataset. Regarding the controls to 
be included, we follow the previous literature. For worker productivity, we include nine 
dummies to pin down the branch of activity for which the individual works, seven dummies 
for the employee’s work status, and seven dummies that divide employment per firm in size 
classes (see the Appendix for details). These controls are intended to take care of industry, 
status and firm-size differentials, which are substantial in the case of Italy (see, for instance, 
Mauro et al., 1999, Cannari and D’Alessio, 1995, and Colussi, 1997). Dummies for the 
father’s work status are included in the equation for entrepreneurship, as in Alesina et al. 
(2001). This captures the strong intergenerational links that characterize occupational 
choices in Italy (see also Checchi et al., 1999). Following Altonji and Blank (1999), we 
introduce the familiar net wealth (and its square) along with a dummy that takes on the value 
of one if the mother is not employed in the specification for female participation (see also 
Algan and Cahuc, 2003). All the additional individual controls enter with high significance 
and with the signs predicted by the theory (not reported in Tables). By including these 
additional controls, the effect of social capital remains positive and strongly correlated with 
any of the individual outcome variables.
10  
There are, however, a number of important reasons for not interpreting the results in 
Table 2 as casual. First, the social capital variable could be measured with error and, more 
importantly, it could correspond poorly with the true social capital that matters in practice; 
                                                            
9   Throughout the paper, we report results with the dummy for south. Results do not change if more 
disaggregated (5 macro-regions) dummies are used. 
10   For the sake of brevity, we report only a selection of the robustness tests performed. For instance, we 
included the local female unemployment rate in the equation for female participation and a measure of local 
financial development in the equation for entrepreneurship. Our results were suitably confirmed.    17 
that is, the cluster of “trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society” 
(Putnam, 2003: 167). This creates attenuation and may bias the linear estimates downwards. 
Second, rich areas may be able to afford or prefer greater sense of civic duty. This reverse 
causality problem introduces positive bias in the linear estimates.
11 Third, there are many 
omitted determinants of individual outcomes that will naturally be correlated with social 
capital. The omitted variable inconsistency also generates an upward bias. All of these 
problems could be solved if we had an instrument for social capital. Such an instrument must 
be an important factor in accounting for the variation in social capital that we observe, but 
have no direct effect on individual economic performance. 
3. The Effect of Social Capital: IV Results 
3.1 The Historical Origins of Social Capital 
Putnam traces the roots of civic community from the middle ages. At that time, the 
Italian peninsula had four different systems of government, corresponding to differing 
degrees of republicanism and autocracy. First, in northern and central Italy there was a form 
of self-government, known as communal republicanism, based on horizontal collaboration 
among citizens. As Hyde (1973: 57) puts it, “communes …were primarily concerned with 
the protection of their members and their common interests”. Political participation was 
high: “men were able to take part in determining, largely by persuasion, the laws and 
decisions governing their lives” (Lane, 1966: 535). Second, farther north there were the 
erstwhile republican areas that by 1300 were ruled by the Signori and in which mediaeval 
republican tradition had proved somewhat weaker. Third, the regions surrounding Rome 
were part of the Papal State, characterized by a mixture of feudalism, tyranny and 
republicanism. Finally, the southern territory belonged to the Kingdom of Sicily, the most 
autocratic regime. Of course, the Norman regime in the south was exceptionally advanced, 
both economically and administratively,
12 but the social and political arrangements were 
                                                            
11    However, by using a microeconomic unit of observation as dependent variable, the scope for 
endogeneity is minimized (see: Isham and Kaufman (1999)). 
12   For instance, the first codification of administrative law (1231) and the foundation of the first state 
university (1224) in Europe took place under Frederick II.    18 
those of an despotic government: barons had full feudal rights, ruler’s decision could not be 
questioned, and a network of central and local officials answering only to the king was in 
power in the towns.
13 
In Putnam’s view, the local political regimes in place in the middle ages shaped the 
degree of local civic commitment that persisted throughout the centuries.
14 In Section 3.4, 
we illustrate an experiment that exploits mediaeval local political regimes as a source of 
exogenous variation for social capital. In Section 3.2 we focus on the period at the end of the 
nineteenth century. The time after the unification of Italy was one of great ferment in 
community life. Stimulated by similar trends in the rest of Europe, there was a surge in 
social solidarity that promoted the “principle of association”. Associations and mutual aid 
societies developed, which provided on a voluntary basis a wide range of social benefits to 
their members (unemployment benefits, medical and life insurance, school financing etc.). 
The period also saw the birth of mass political movements, both socialist and catholic. We 
rely on two regional measures of civic traditions collected by Putnam (1993: 148-151): the 
turnout in the few relatively open elections before Fascism brought authoritarian rule to Italy 
and the density of local associations. These variables are the measures we use to find a 
source of exogenous variation for social capital. As for the persistence of social capital, two 
features of these variables should be noted. First, the measures are correlated with the local 
system of government in place in the middle ages (see Section 3.4). Second, they represent 
significant determinants of the average provincial electoral referendum turnout, which is our 
measure of current social capital. This last relationship will represent the first stage in our 
instrumental variable approach. 
                                                            
13   See also the De Long and Shleifer (1993) classification of western government, according to which 
Frederick II’s regime falls into the absolutist category, while the Venetian and Florentine republics are the best 
examples of city-state based non-absolutist government.  
14   According to Putnam, despotism survived until Frederick’s death: “Although southern Italy in the next 
seven centuries was to be the subject of much bitter contention between various foreign dynasties (especially 
Spain and France), [the] hierarchic structure would endure essentially unchanged” (Putnam, 1993: 124). On the 
other hand, “despite the eclipse of communal republicanism … after the fourteenth century, in the nineteenth 
century … [one] could detect the continuing regional differences of culture and social structure that had 
appeared in the medieval era seven centuries earlier” (Putnam, 1993: 136).    19 
3.2 2SLS Results with Nineteenth-Century Instruments 
Two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates of equation (1) are presented in Table 3. Social 
capital, SCp, is treated as endogenous, and instrumented by the nineteenth-century variables. 
The identification assumption implied by our approach is that, conditional on the controls 
included in the regression, the measures of social capital a hundred years ago have no effect 
on individual economic outcomes today, other than through the persistence of social capital. 
Panel A of Table 3 reports 2SLS estimates of the coefficient of interest, β from equation (1), 
and Panel B gives the corresponding first stages.  
For each dependent variable, the first two specifications used in Table 3 replicate those 
illustrated in Table 2. Therefore, specifications (1), (4) and (7) replicate respectively 
specifications (2), (5) and (8) of Table 2; while specifications (2), (5) and (8) replicate 
respectively specifications (3), (6) and (9) of Table 2.
15 All covariates that are included in 
the second stage (age or experience, years of schooling, sex, marital status, number of 
children, dummy for south, and additional controls) are also included in the first stage. 
Covariates, however, are not reported to save space. The last column for each dependent 
variable (that is, columns 3, 6 and 9) reports the results from a specification that includes 
nineteenth-century urbanization and contemporaneous education. According to Tabellini 
(2005), including these two variables helps to disentangle the effect of the historical 
variables from that of unobserved determinants of current performance. In particular, 
nineteenth-century population density proxies for the economic development of the local 
area (see also Acemoglu et al., 2002) at about the same point in time as the historical 
instrument for social capital. This will minimize the risk that the component of social capital 
explained by history is indeed capturing standard neoclassical convergence. By the same 
token, controlling for contemporaneous education avoids the risk that our estimates will pick 
up the effect of a rising secular trend in schooling. 
For any of the three individual economic outcomes, there is a strong first-stage 
relationship between nineteenth-century variables and social capital. The first-stage R-
                                                            
15    Again, standard errors are clustered at the province level. However, since the nineteenth-century 
measures of social capital are available at the regional level, we also computed standard error corrected for 
within-region correlation with no modification of our results. 
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squared is always over 80 per cent and the instruments are jointly highly significant (the p-
value of the F-statistic is always equal to zero in the first four decimals).
16 Note that 
population density is negatively and significantly correlated with social capital. This 
supports the identification assumption as current social capital does not reflect economic 
development at the end of the nineteenth century. Turning to the 2SLS estimates, with the 
exception of entrepreneurship, all the IV coefficients are considerably larger than their OLS 
and LPM counterparts. This suggests that measurement error in the social capital variable 
that creates attenuation bias is likely to be more important than reverse causality and omitted 
variable biases. The standard errors for the IV estimates are also larger than the Table 2 
counterparts, but social capital still enters at a reasonable levels of statistical significance. 
Note also that the role of population density and human capital in the second stage is 
considerably reduced.  
  We also investigate the validity of our exclusion restriction by using over-
identification tests (see Wooldbrige, 2002, for general reference and Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson, 2001, for the use of this test in a context very similar to ours). The over-
identification test presumes that one of the instruments, say turnout, is truly exogenous, and 
tests for the exogeneity of the other, associations in our case. The over-identification test will 
reject the validity of our approach if at least one of the instruments has a direct effect on the 
dependent variable (i.e. one of the instruments is correlated with the error term in equation 
1).
17 However, since this test may not lead to a rejection if all instruments are invalid but still 
highly correlated with each other, the results have to be interpreted with caution.
18 As can be 
seen from the reported Hensen J-statistic p-values in Table 3, the data support the over-
identifying restriction implied by our approach. There is no evidence that nineteenth-century 
variables have a direct effect – or an effect working through a variable other than social 
capital – on the three individual economic activities. 
                                                            
16   To check for the potential bias caused by many weakly correlated instruments we also estimate the same 
equations using a single instrument, the first principal component from the two nineteenth-century variables.  
The results are very similar to the IV estimates using the two instruments together (but slightly less precise 
since they use less variation).  
17   Another cause for rejection could be that the coefficient for social capital in equation (1) is not constant. 
18    It could also be that the test has low power to detect endogeneity of some of the instruments 
(Wooldridge, 2002).    21 
Do the 2SLS estimates imply that social capital can explain a significant fraction of the 
variability of the individual outcomes? Our estimates of Table 3 imply that social capital has 
a large but not implausible effect. According to our results, moving from the average 
southern province to the average northern province would have large effects on economic 
activity. It would increase labour productivity by 12 percentage points, increase the 
probability of being an entrepreneur by 4 percentage points, and increase the probability for 
a woman of participating in the labour market by 13 percentage points.  
3.3 2SLS Results with Contemporary Instruments 
We can check whether the difference between the OLS/LPM results and the 2SLS is due 
to measurement error in the social capital variable by making use of alternative 
contemporary measures of social capital. As explained by Woolbridge (2000), using these 
measures as instruments for the referendum turnout would resolve the measurement error, 
but not the endogeneity/omitted variable problem. Our previous results  for worker 
productivity and female participation suggest that the difference between OLS/LPM and 
2SLS results is driven by the attenuation bias. If this is the case, then the 2SLS results 
obtained by using contemporary instruments should be higher than those obtained by using 
the nineteenth-century instruments. On the other hand, 2SLS estimates for entrepreneurship 
are roughly in line with those from linear regression, suggesting that the net bias from 
omitted variable, endogeneity and measurement is of limited magnitude. So we would expect 
that instrumenting with contemporary alternative measures of social capital will deliver 
estimates that are once again in the same range.
19 
To carry out this exercise we make use of an additional measure of social capital: blood 
donation. The variable denotes the number of (16 oz) blood bags collected (per 1,000 
inhabitants) in 1995 by AVIS, the Italian association of voluntary blood donors. Blood 
donation, which aims to capture solidarity and altruism, also comes from Guiso et al. (2004). 
As they explain, blood collection by AVIS is very representative of the whole of blood 
                                                            
19   In principle it is also possible that a large endogeneity bias is offset by a large measurement error. We 
show that this is not the case, as it would result in contemporary instruments 2SLS estimates being higher than  
those from nineteenth-century instrument 2SLS. 
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donations in the country and it is not affected by the geographical differences in the quality 
of medical infrastructures. 
Table 4 shows the results of the 2SLS estimates using blood donation as instrument for 
social capital. As expected, this alternative measure of social capital is highly correlated with 
referendum turnout. The first-stage R-squared ranges is always over 80 per cent. For both 
worker productivity and female participation,  the estimates of social capital are always of 
the right order of magnitude to explain the difference between the OLS/LPM estimates of 
Table 2 and the 2SLS estimates of Table 3. They are higher than the estimates obtained by 
using the nineteenth-century instruments. This supports the idea that OLS/LPM estimates are 
downward biased because of measurement error, while endogeneity/omitted variable 
positive biases play a minor role. In contrast, the estimates for entrepreneurship are not 
higher than those from linear regression and nineteenth-century instrument 2SLS.   
3.4 2SLS Results with Fourteenth-Century  Instruments 
In this section we use data on the local systems of government in early mediaeval Italy  
This amounts to pushing Putnam’s conjecture as far as it can go. We rely on historical 
sources to classify today’s Italian provinces according to the political regimes prevailing at 
the beginning of the fourteenth century. We use the historical sources quoted by Putnam 
(1993: 134): Barraclough and Stone (1989), Hyde (1973), and Larner (1980). In addition, we 
use the map “L’Italia intorno al 1300” made available by an online provider of historical 
maps (www.sapere.it/tca/minisite/storia/atlantestorico).  
We are able to classify contemporary Italian provinces in 5 groups: (1) the communal 
republics, the heartland of republicanism; (2) the Signorie, former communal republics fallen 
prey to signorial rule by the beginning of the fourteenth century; (3) the Papal State, 
characterized by a  mixture of feudalism, tyranny and republicanism; and (4) the Kingdom of 
Sicily, which had the highest degree of autocracy. We also add a residual category for the 
current areas of Italy that were peripheral areas and, at the beginning of the fourteenth 
century, politically closer to foreign nations than to Italian local states. In this vein, the 
residual category includes Sardinia, Western Piedmont and Trentino, which at that time were    23 
closer to Spain, France and Germany, respectively. Appendix II lists the current Italian 
provinces classified according their fourteenth century political regime. 
We note that the mapping of contemporary Italian provinces into mediaeval territories 
can only be imperfect. We attribute to the entire province the regime that was in place in the 
provincial capital in the middle ages. This method has two shortcomings. First, it fails to 
take into account  that contemporary borders are different from mediaeval borders. For 
instance, the area included in the contemporary province of Florence is different from that of 
the Communal Republic of Florence.
20 Second, for the communal republics and the 
Signorie, the  high degree of civic participation was mainly an urban feature. Therefore, it 
might be not appropriate to conjecture that the countryside shared the same degree of 
republicanism of the urban centre. 
In Table 5 we present the results of the 2SLS estimates using as instruments a series of 
dummies for the fourteenth-century local political systems. The exclusion restriction implied 
in this case is that, conditional on the controls included in the regression, the measures of 
local political regimes seven hundred years ago have no effect on individual economic 
outcomes today, other than through the persistence of social capital. Notwithstanding the 
caveats of the mapping procedure, the results are intriguing. We find a strong (first-stage) 
relationship between fourteenth-century political variables and current endowments of social 
capital. The first-stage R-squared is always over 80 per cent and the instruments are jointly 
highly significant (the p-value of the F-statistic is always equal to zero in the first four 
decimals). Our estimates support Putnam’s argument: compared with communal republics 
(which represent the omitted category in our regression), all the remaining dummies for 
mediaeval political regimes are negatively correlated with current endowments of social 
capital. As expected, the difference is limited for the Signorie, more pronounced for the 
Papal State, and fairly large for the southern provinces once part of the Kingdom of Sicily. 
Finally, the difference for the residual peripheral areas is at an intermediate level. Our 2SLS 
estimates show that the component of social capital explained by mediaeval local political 
systems is positively correlated with entrepreneurship and female participation. Compared 
                                                            
20    However, one might think that since the area of contemporary provinces reflects local historical 
developments this inaccuracy should not be very great. 
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with the 2SLS results with nineteenth-century variable as instruments, the point estimates are 
higher for the former economic outcome and lower for the latter; while the over-
identification tests support the validity of our exclusion restriction. As to the effect on 
worker productivity, our results are inconclusive. The over-identification tests do not allow 
us to find any support for causality running from the local endowments of social capital to 
wages. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
When Robert Putnam published “Making Democracy Work” in 1993, scholars and 
observers immediately ranked the book as a major step forward. According to The 
Economist, the book was a “great work of social science…alongside de Tocqueville, Pareto 
and Weber”.
21 After more than ten years, one can safely say that the assessment by The 
Economist was by no means overstated. A stream of research has originated from Putnam’s 
book: social capital now represents one of the most popular metaphors in current social 
science research. Beyond making the case for social capital, “Making Democracy Work” 
provides also a more subtle contribution. As Durlauf and Fafchamps (2006) recognize, the 
task of estimating the effect of social capital on economic performance relies critically on the 
possibility of isolating exogenous sources of variation in social capital. In other words, 
because the problem of endogeneity is endemic, it is very difficult to make the point that 
social capital is relevant if no explanation is offered for what determines social capital. From 
this perspective, Putnam’s book made a seminal contribution because, in addition to 
popularizing the concept of informal norms, it provided a theory of the determinants of 
social capital. 
In this paper we exploit Putnam’s theory on the historical origins of social capital to 
identify a source of exogenous differences in social capital. It is useful to point out that these 
results do not imply that informal norms today are predetermined by the mediaeval political 
experience and cannot be changed. Indeed, for our empirical approach to work, we do not 
                                                            
21   This is reported on the cover of Putnam’s book.    25 
need past social capital to be the only, or even the main, cause of variation in social capital. 
All we need is for it to be a source of exogenous variation.  
We estimate large effects of social capital on individual economic performances using 
the historical data on the origin of social capital as the source of variation. We also document 
that this relationship is robust to a number of econometric checks and controls for 
environmental and individual variables that might be correlated with social capital. Our 
exclusion restriction implies that, conditional on the controls included in the regression, the 
historical variables have no effect on individual economic outcomes today, other than 
through social capital persistence. The plausibility of our identification strategy is open to 
debate. Our exclusion restriction would be weakened if historical social capital depended in 
a systematic way on other characteristics of the local area. Putnam (1993) argues that this 
does not seem to be the case, since civic differences between Italian regions have been far 
more stable than economic differences over almost a millennium. In the paper, we show that 
econometric tests do not enable us to reject the exclusion restriction. 
Still, questions remain. It remains to be uncovered why social capital impacts on 
development in some periods but not in others. For instance, the north-south economic gap 
reversed its direction in several periods. The Norman kingdom was almost as advanced as 
the north but then the development of communal republicanism stimulated the northern 
economy; then, because of external shocks, the supremacy of the north disappeared again in 
the fifteenth century. For the period after unification to which our data refers, there was no 
correlation between social capital and the economic well-being of the regions.  Then, in the 
second half of the twentieth century social capital became a powerful source of economic 
prosperity. On these matters, North (1990) suggests that as a market economy develops the 
scope for social capital to reduce transaction cost increases, since greater specialization 
increases the number of transitions between strangers both over time and across space. On 
related grounds, differences in social capital endowments could matter more when new 
technologies that require investments from a broad cross-section of the society become 
available, along the lines proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2002). 
As pointed out by North (1991), the question of the respective roles of informal 
constraints and formal rules remains crucial to uncover the role of history in economic 
performance: “What is it about informal constraints that gives (the institutions) such a    26 
pervasive influence upon the long-run character of the economy? What is the relationship 
between formal and informal constraints? How does an economy develop the informal 
constraints that make individuals constrain their behavior so that they make political and 
judicial systems effective forces to third party enforcement?” (North, 1991: 111). From this 
perspective, our results provide evidence that informal constraints matter: differences in 
trust, reciprocity, and habits of co-operation lead to large differences in economic outcomes 
across areas characterized by identical formal institutions. Moreover, the econometric 
strength of our results is comparable with that of the literature on the relevance of formal 
institutions, which relies on similar assumptions and similar tests. Still, we believe there is a 
long way to go before a final answer to North’s question can be attempted. The extent to 
which informal norms are being shaped by past institutions or the latter have adapted to pre-
existent endowments of social capital remains a challenging topic for further research. Table 1a 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Observations  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
 
Panel A. SHIW Dataset: Dependent variables 
Worker productivity  23,097  2.47 0.41 1.16 3.64 
Entrepreneurship  14,694 0.10  0.29  0  1 
Female participation  14,070 0.49  0.49  0  1 
    Panel B. SHIW Dataset: Other selected variables
 
Years of schooling  23,097 10.90  3.96  2  20 
Experience  23,097 22.23 11.99  14  57 
Age  14,694 44.37  9.58  19  88 
Dummy if female  23,097 0.39  0.47  0  1 
Dummy if married  23,097 0.66  0.49  0  1 
Number of children  14,070 0.65  0.87  0  6 
Dummy for south  23,097 0.30  0.46  0  1 
Panel C. Variables defined at the provincial level
 
Social capital  99  0.80 0.08 0.62 0.92 
Blood donation  99  0.29 0.20 0.01 1.05 
Human capital  99  7,28 0,46 6,32 8,62 
Population density  99  4,72 0,63 3,19 6,99 
Panel D. Variables defined at the regional level
 
Turnout  20  0.19 1.09 -1.87 2.26 
Associations  20 0.01  0.01 0 0.03 
       
       
Notes: See the Appendix I for more detailed variable definitions and sources. 
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Table 1b 
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE VARIABLES DEFINED AT THE 
GEOGRAPHICAL LEVEL 
  Social    
capital 
Blood 
donation 
Human 
capital 
Population 
density 
Turnout Associations 
Social capital  1  0.70 0.77 0.07  0.67 0.76 
Blood donation   1  0.63  -0.14  0.57  0.38 
Human capital     1  0.08  0.80  0.50 
Population density      1  -0.08  -0.35 
Turnout       1  0.21 
Associations         1  
         
Notes: Correlation coefficients are calculated at the regional level. For the variables defined 
at the provincial level of Panel C in Table 1a, we use their regional average. See the 
Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. 
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Table 2 
OLS AND LPM REGRESSIONS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent 
variable 
Worker productivity  Entrepreneurship Female  participation 
           
Social 
capital 
0.332***  0.077  0.153  0.244*** 0.289*** 0.261*** 0.798***  0.485*  0.368 
  (0.073) (0.124) (0.100) (0.041) (0.092) (0.088) (0.108) (0.249) (0.235) 
Years of 
schooling  0.060*** 0.060*** 0.036*** -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.006*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Experience/
Age 
0.029*** 0.029*** 0.021*** -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.013*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Experience/
Age squared 
(×100) 
-0.034*** -0.034*** -0.025*** 0.018***  0.017***  0.017*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.036*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Dummy if 
female 
-0.088*** -0.088*** -0.080*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029***       
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)       
Dummy if 
married 
0.087***  0.087***  0.072***        
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)        
Number of 
children         -0.045***  -0.045***  -0.042*** 
         (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Dummy for 
south 
 -0.052**  -0.041**   0.009  -0.003    -0.064  -0.042 
   (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.047)  (0.042) 
           
Additional 
controls 
NO  NO YES NO  NO YES NO  NO YES 
R-squared  0.40 0.40 0.48 0.24 0.25 0.37 0.23 0.23 0.24 
Obs.  23,097 23,097 23,097 14,694 14,694 14,694 14,070 14,070 14,070 
           
Notes: The White robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential 
clustering of the residuals at the provincial level. Regressions include calendar year 
dummies. Experience instead of age is used only for worker productivity. Additional controls 
include: industry dummies, work status dummies, and firm size dummies for worker 
productivity; father’s work status dummies for entrepreneurship; and family net wealth, 
family net wealth squared, and a dummy if the mother was not employed for female 
participation. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions and sources. 
Regressions are weighted to population proportions. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 
1%  (5%) [10%] level.     30 
Table 3 
2SLS REGRESSIONS WITH NINETEENTH CENTURY VARIABLES AS 
INSTRUMENTS 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent 
variable 
Worker productivity  Entrepreneurship Female  participation 
  Panel A: Two stages least squares
 
Social capital  0.893*** 0.904*** 0.895***  0.323  0.299  0.327*  1.208*** 1.022*** 1.040*** 
  (0.339) (0.290) (0.270) (0.223) (0.204) (0.176) (0.426) (0.393) (0.364) 
Population 
density     0.002     -0.010*     0.002 
     (0.013)    (0.067)    (0.012) 
Human 
capital     0.028    -0.008    -0.031 
     (0.019)    (0.008)    (0.026) 
Test of over-
identification   
(10)             
0.15 0.19 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.30 0.37 0.44 0.56 
  Panel B: First stage for social capital
 
Turnout   0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021***  0.020*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Associations  4.465*** 4.458*** 4.111*** 4.117***  4.109**  3.710***  3.879**  3.797**  3.306** 
  (1.466)  (1.459) (1.268)  (1.574) (1.571) (1.381) (1.728) (1.712) (1.500) 
Population 
density     -0.014*     -0.015*     -0.016** 
     (0.007)     (0.007)    (0.007) 
Human 
capital     0.002     0.003    0.002 
     (0.007)     (0.007)    (0.008) 
R-squared  0.84 0.84 0.85  0.84 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.85 
Test of joint 
significance 
of the 
instruments 
(11) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
            
Dummy for 
south  YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Additional 
controls  NO YES  YES  NO YES  YES NO YES  YES 
Obs.  23,097 23,097 23,097  14,694 14,694 14,694 14,070 14,070 14,070 
           
Notes: The White robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential 
clustering of the residuals at the provincial level. Regressions include calendar year 
dummies. Specifications (1), (4) and (7) replicate respectively specifications (2), (5) and (8) 
of Table 2; specifications (2), (5) and (8) replicate respectively specifications (3), (6) and (9) 
of Table 2; specifications (3), (6) and (9) augment respectively specifications (3), (6) and (9) 
of Table 2 with population density and human capital. Note (10) Hensen J Statistics: p-value. 
- (11) F statistics: p value. All covariates that are included in the second stage are also 
included in the first stage. Covariates are not reported to save space. Panel A reports the two 
stage least squares estimates, instrumenting for social capital using nineteenth-century 
variables; Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. See the Appendix for more detailed 
variable definitions and sources. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. *** 
(**) [*] denotes significance at the 1%  (5%) [10%] level.     31 
Table 4 
 2SLS REGRESSIONS WITH BLOOD DONATION AS INSTRUMENT 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9) 
Dependent 
variable 
Worker productivity  Entrepreneurship Female  participation 
 
Panel A: Two stages least squares 
Social capital  1.326**  1.087**  1.125** 0.246  0.169  0.171  1.556* 1.309* 1.253* 
  (0.655) (0.522) (0.515) (0.325) (0.308) (0.287) (0.851) (0.786) (0.734) 
Population 
density     0.004     -0.012**     0.005 
     (0.015)    (0.006)    (0.015) 
Human capital     0.027     -0.007     -0.033 
     (0.017)    (0.009)    (0.026) 
  Panel B: First stage for social capital 
Blood donation  0.778*** 0.773*** 0.788*** 0.808*** 0.806*** 0.826*** 0.786*** 0.769*** 0.787*** 
  (0.204) (0.202) (0.201) (0.214) (0.214) (0.213) (0.217) (0.215) (0.213) 
Population 
density     -0.012    -0.014    -0.015 
     (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.009) 
Human capital     0.007    0.009    0.010 
 
   (0.010)    (0.011)    (0.011) 
R-squared
 
0.81 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.83 
Test of joint 
significance of 
the instruments 
(F-statistic: p-
value) 
0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 
           
Dummy for 
south 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Additional 
controls 
NO YES  YES NO YES  YES NO YES  YES 
Observations  23,097 23,097 23,097 14,694 14,694 14,694 14,070 14,070 14,070 
 
         
Notes: The White robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential 
clustering of the residuals at the provincial level. Regressions include calendar year 
dummies. Specifications (1), (4) and (7) replicate respectively specifications (2), (5) and (8) 
of Table 2; specifications (2), (5) and (8) replicates respectively specifications (3), (6) and (9) 
of Table 2; specifications (3), (6) and (9) augment respectively specifications (3), (6) and (9) 
of Table 2 with population density and human capital. All covariates that are included in the 
second stage are also included in the first stage. Covariates are not reported to save space. 
Panel A reports the two stage least squares estimates, instrumenting for social capital using 
blood donation; Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. See the Appendix for more 
detailed variable definitions and sources. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. 
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1%  (5%) [10%] level.  
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Table 5  
2SLS REGRESSIONS WITH FOURTEENTH CENTURY VARIABLES AS 
INSTRUMENTS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent var. 
 
Worker productivity  Entrepreneurship Female  participation 
  Panel A: Two stages least squares 
Social capital  0.204  0.427  0.573*  0.670** 0.615** 0.525**  0.843  0.710  0.701 
  (0.399) (0.366) (0.341) (0.290) (0.271) (0.251) (0.625) (0.569) (0.470) 
Population 
density     -0.002    -0.008    -0.003 
     (0.013)    (0.007)    (0.012) 
Human capital     0.029    -0.009    -0.028 
     (0.020)    (0.008)    (0.028) 
Test of  Over-
identification    
(10)  
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.32 0.30 0.59 0.70 0.66 0.48 
  Panel B: First stage for social capital 
Ex-communal 
republics  -0.022** 
-
0.023*** 
-0.020**  -0.020**  -0.020** -0.017 -0.021**  -0.020** -0.017 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
Papal State  -
0.036*** 
-
0.036*** 
-
0.043*** 
-
0.034*** 
-
0.034*** 
-
0.042*** 
-
0.035*** 
-
0.034*** 
-
0.043*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.12) 
Kingdom of 
Sicily 
-
0.086*** 
-
0.086*** 
-
0.065*** 
-
0.086*** 
-
0.086*** 
-
0.064*** 
-
0.089*** 
-
0.088*** 
-
0.064*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Peripheral areas   -
0.053*** 
-
0.053*** 
-
0.061*** 
-
0.051*** 
-
0.051*** 
-
0.060*** 
-
0.052*** 
-
0.051*** 
-
0.060*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) 
Population dens.     -0.018*    -0.019*     -0.020** 
     (0.010)    (0.010)    (0.009) 
Human capital     0.014    0.015    0.016 
     (0.011)    (0.012)    (0.012) 
R-squared  0.82 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.84 
Test of joint 
significance of 
the instruments 
(11) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
           
Dum. for south  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Additional 
controls  NO YES  YES NO YES  YES NO YES  YES 
Obs.  23,097 23,097 23,097 14,694 14,694 14,694 14,070 14,070 14,070 
         
Notes: The White robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for the potential clustering of the 
residuals at the provincial level. Regressions include calendar year dummies. Specifications (1), (4) 
and (7) replicate respectively specifications (2), (5) and (8) of Table 2; specifications (2), (5) and (8) 
replicates respectively specifications (3), (6) and (9) of Table 2; specifications (3), (6) and (9) augment 
respectively specifications (3), (6) and (9) of Table 2 with population density and human capital. - (10) 
Hensen J Statistics: p-value. -  (11) F statistics: p value. All covariates that are included in the second 
stage are also included in the first stage. Covariates are not reported to save space. Panel A reports the 
two stage least squares estimates, instrumenting for social capital using fourteenth-century variables; 
Panel B reports the corresponding first stage. See the Appendix for more detailed variable definitions 
and sources. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. *** (**) [*] denotes significance at 
the 1%  (5%) [10%] level.    33 
 
Appendix I 
 Theoretical background for the augmented Mincerian wage-equation 
 
In what follows we sketch a simple model that generates a Mincerian wage-equation “augmented” with a 
local social capital term. The framework is borrowed from Dalmazzo and de Blasio (2006b) and is similar to 
Rauch (1993), Acemoglu and Angrist (2000). Like Moretti (2004), it treats each area j (with j=1,…,J) as a 
competitive economy that produces a single output y traded on the global market at a price equal to one. We 
assume a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology that employs capital, K, and effective units of 
labour, L. The typical firm operating in area j has the following production function: 
 (a1)  y = A(SCj ) . K1-α . Lα    
with 0<α<1. The term A(SCj), a function of local social capital SCj, captures the effects of social capital 
spillovers on productivity in area j, and we assume that  d A(SCj)/dSCj ≥ 0 . Thus, A(SCj) measures the 
productivity advantage enjoyed by a firm operating in area j. Effective units of labour are defined as  L = Σ 
s(hi) for i=1 to N, with s’(hi) >0; the firm hires N workers and each worker i supplies s units of effective 
labour. The effectiveness s of worker i is increasing with his individual education, hi. In each area j, the 
competitive price of a unit of effective labour is denoted by ωj. Capital is rented on the global market at rate r. 
Given the local level of social capital SCj, each competitive firm in area j maximizes profit, π = y – r K – 
ωj L by choosing (K,L). The first-order conditions for this maximum problem are: 
(a2)                                                (δπ/δΚ) = (1−α). A(SCj) . K-α . Lα - r = 0 
(a3)                                                (δπ/δL) =  α. A(SCj) . K1-α  . Lα−1 - ωj = 0   
By using (a1), expressions (a2) and (a3) can be manipulated into  K = (1 – α) y / r  and L = α y / ωj , 
respectively. By substituting these expressions for (K,L) back into the production function (a1), we obtain the 
equilibrium value of ωj, the local price of an effective unit of labour: 
(a4)                                                                        ωj, =  µ [ A(SCj)]1/α 
where µ = [α ((1−α) / r) . exp((1-α) / α )]. Notice that d ωj /dSCj ≥0 : a higher level of social capital will raise 
the price of an effective unit of labour in the area considered. Moreover, by substituting the equilibrium 
expressions for (K,L) into the profit expression π, it can be immediately verified that each firm will make zero 
profit in equilibrium. As a consequence, firms have no incentive to move across areas.  
The wage received by individual i in area j, denoted by wij, is simply equal to ωj × s(hi). Thus, taking 
logs:    34 
(a5)                                     log wij  = log µ  + log s(hi) + (1/α) log Α(SCj)   
Similarly to Moretti (2004, p.178), we suppose that the logs of effective labour s and the production 
externality A(SCj) are linear functions of individual education and local human capital, respectively. Thus, it 
holds that: 
(a6)                                                    log s(hi) = φ + β . hi,      β>0                         
and 
(a7)                                                      log A(SCj) =  θ + γ . SCj ,  γ ≥0  
By substituting (a6) and (a7) into expression (a5), we finally obtain a Mincerian wage-equation augmented 
with a local social capital term:  
(a8)                                                     log wij  = κ + β . hi + η . SCj    
where the constant κ is equal to [log µ + φ + (θ /α)]  , and η = γ /α .  
Equation (a8) thus justifies the empirical model provided in the text for worker productivity. As in Rauch 
(1993), Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Moretti (2004), if local social capital generates positive spillovers 
on productivity, it will hold that η>0. By contrast, when η=0, the model collapses back into the standard 
Mincerian equation, where wage differences only depend on individual education (here we obviously abstract 
from worker’s “experience”).     35 
Appendix II 
Italian provinces classified by fourteenth-century local political regimes 
 
Communal republics 
Arezzo,  Bologna,  Ferrara, Firenze, Forlì, Grosseto, Imperia,  La Spezia, Livorno, Lucca,  Massa Carrara , 
Modena,  Padova, Pisa, Pistoia,  Prato, Ravenna, Reggio Emilia, Rimini, Savona, Siena, Treviso, Venezia 
Ex-communal republics (Signorie) 
Alessandria,  Asti, Belluno,  Bergamo, Biella, Brescia, Como, Cremona, Gorizia, Lecco, Lodi,  Mantova,  
Milano, Novara, Parma, Pavia, Piacenza, Pordenone,  Rovigo, Sondrio, Trieste, Udine, Varese, Verbania-
Cusio-Ossola, Vercelli, Verona, Vicenza 
Papal State 
Ancona, Ascoli Piceno, Frosinone, Latina, Macerata, Perugia, Pesaro e Urbino, Rieti, Roma, Terni, Viterbo 
  Kingdom of Sicily   
Agrigento, Bari, Benevento, Brindisi, Campobasso, Catania, Catanzaro, Chieti, Cosenza, Crotone, Enna, 
Foggia, Isernia, L'Aquila, Lecce, Matera, Messina, Napoli, Palermo, Pescara, Potenza, Ragusa, Reggio 
Calabria, Salerno, Siracusa, Taranto, Teramo, Trapani, Vibo Valentia 
Peripheral areas 
Aosta, Bolzano, Cagliari, Cuneo, Nuoro, Oristano, Sassari,  Torino, Trento. 
 
Notes: Based on Barraclough and Stone (1989), Hyde (1973), Larner (1980), and the map “L’Italia 
intorno al 1300” from www.sapere.it/tca/minisite/storia/atlantestorico.  
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